In times past political party leaders dominated the process by which candidates were nominated to run in the general election. In the late 1800s, during the Progressive Era, reformers working from within the party system struggled to implement key changes to the nomination process among other things. As a result, candidates were no longer selected through backroom deals, but through primary elections (see Party Machines, p. 579 and The Progressive Attack, pp. 580-582). It is for this reason that this article about local party leaders being upset about several of the positions South Carolina Senator Lindsey Graham is found on the back pages of the New York Times. While Charleston County Republican Party leaders are upset with Graham, as the article notes, Graham received over 65% of the Republican primary vote in Charleston County. Members of Congress are attentive to what their constituents want, but those constituents are often different than party leaders (see The Vote, pp. 302-304 and The Logic of Elections Revisited, pp. 550-551).
The civil rights movement began as a movement to prevent discrimination against African Americans and to allow them the same opportunities for political and social participation. Because of the success of the civil rights movement leaders have attempted to parlay that success into further extensions of civil rights legislation to include other minority groups who feel they are discriminated against (see Emergence of a Civil Rights Coalition, pp. 159-163, The Legacy of the Civil Rights Movement, pp. 175-180 and Rights for Hispanics, pp. 180-184). President Obama’s signature of a new hate crimes law yesterday, as this National Public Radio report explains, marks the first time sexual orientation has been included as a part of hate crimes legislation. While various state and local governments have included such legal language in their statutes, this is the first time the national government has extended its influence in such a way (see Gay Rights, pp. 184-185 and The Paths to Nationalization, pp. 111-113).
Since 2002 national banks have been subject solely to national governmental regulation on the basis that a national policy more efficiently and effectively (see Preemption Legislations, p. 128 and Powers of Congress, pp. 250-251). By lowering the transaction costs of having to deal with different regulations in different states, banks argued that they were able to provide services at a lower price. (see The Logic of Nationalization, pp. 108-111 and Transaction Costs, pp. 22-24). With the questionable practices that were uncovered with the collapse of many financial institutions in the summer and fall of 2008, Congress is debating a bill, as this article explains, that would eliminate the national government’s preemptive control over financial regulation and allow states to set their own policies above and beyond those of the national government (see Federalism: A Byproduct of National Policy, pp. 134-135).
The President has many rolls and responsibilities, among those is the role of leader and director of his or her political party. Because of his or her high visibility among activists, donors, and voters in general, the President acts as a party coordinating mechanism to help the party advance its electoral and policy goals (see The President as Party Coordinator pp. 603-604 and Mobilizing Public Opinion, pp. 344-350). As a result, as this article explains, the struggles of the Democratic nominees for Governor in New Jersey and Virginia are a reflection of voters’ opinions about President Obama’s performance. Because President Obama shares the same Democratic party label as Virginia gubernatorial candidate Creigh Deeds, citizens use information about President Obama as a shortcut to predict what a Governor Deeds would do in office (see To Use Party Labels and Enforce Collective Responsibility, pp. 563-564 and Voter Cues and Shortcuts, pp. 525-526).
In Federalist 10 James Madison warned against the influence of factions. He argued that, given that the only way to remove the causes of factions was to deny liberty or create a homogeneous population, a government must be formed in a way that limits the effects of factions. In deed in our own time, factions, and those they hire to advocate their cause have proliferated as government has expanded into more aspects of life. In order to advocate their cause lobbyists and interest groups use insider and outsider tactics to influence the actions of legislators (see Federalist No. 10, pp. 84-86 and The Logic of Lobbying, pp. 610-612). As this article points out, interest groups who hired former congressional staffers or other close friends of members of Congress were able to gain access and influence over the process through which government decisions are made and procure $103 million in government contracts in the Military Construction Appropriations bill (see Insider Tactics: Trafficking in Information and Cultivating Access, pp. 628-633 and The Politics of Access, p. 632).
While Congress has been debating health care legislation, some state legislatures have begun to take steps to limit the ability of Congress to impose federal mandates that all individuals purchase health care or face penalties, as this article explains. Unlike a parliamentary system or a confederation, the governmental system in the United States divides governmental power between the Federal government and State governments, allocating to each certain responsibilities. While some founders envisioned a dual-federalist system, where state and national governments had separate areas of responsibility, United States’ federalism is more of a shared federalist system, where Federal and State governments share jurisdiction over areas of policy (see American-Style Federalism, pp. 98-103). As the article points out, the judiciary is most likely to rule that federal law trumps a state’s challenge to national policy, however, in recent years the Supreme Court has taken action to preserve state independence and prevent the federal government from implementing policy and administrative restrictions on the states (see The National Government’s Advantage in the Courts, pp. 125-128 and A Fourth Era? The Court as Chief Referee, pp. 424-426).
The 435 seats in the House of Representatives are distributed among the states roughly proportional to their populations. Subsequent Supreme Court rulings have also dictated that districts within each state must have equal populations (see Congressional Districts, pp. 252-253). The limit of the number of seats in Congress, however, as this article points out, causes disparity in the size of districts across states. Wishing to remedy this situation, plaintiffs from five underrepresented states have filed a legal challenge in federal court to order Congress to remedy that disparity by lifting its cap on membership. As the article points out, while the change would allow all citizens equal representation in the House of Representatives, it would increase the membership of that body thus also increasing the costs of overcoming collective action problems. (see Collective Action Problems and The Costs of Collective Action, pp. 12-26 and The Tricky Business of Institutional Reform, pp. 722-723).
The Supreme Court hears oral arguments tomorrow in a case that challenges some of the Court’s previous rulings on campaign finance laws. The case, Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission, challenges the Court’s decisions in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce and portions of McConnell v. FEC where the court upheld campaign restrictions on corporations (see The Prospects for Institutional Reform, pp. 697-699 and Regulating Campaign Money, pp. 536-538). As this article in the Washington Post points out Citizens United v. FEC calls into question the role of stare decisis in the Court’s decisions. Stare decisis is the judicial system’s doctrine of following previous precedent in deciding current cases. This procedural doctrine provides stability and legitimacy to the Court’s decisions. Although not unheard of, in deciding to overturn a previous ruling, as Chief Justice John Roberts explains, justices must “look at these other factors, like settled expectations, like the legitimacy of the court, like whether a particular precedent is workable or not, whether a precedent has been eroded by subsequent developments” (see Doctrine: Policymaking by the Court, pp. 435-437)
While the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution mandates that Senators must be directly elected by the people and not selected by state legislatures, it makes not specific requirements as to how each specific state must fill vacancies caused by a senator’s resignation or death. As a result, each state creates its own rules in such circumstances (see Transformation of the Senate, pp. 103-104). The recent death of Senator Edward Kennedy created such a vacancy, however, in Massachusetts, unlike in most other states, the current law does not allow for the Governor to appoint a temporary replacement to that seat. While this article discusses the Massachusetts Legislature’s move to change that, it also points out that Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick would ask the individual he appoints to not run in the special election that would fill the seat for the remainder of Senator Kennedy’s term, thus negating any possible incumbency advantage that would come from occupying the seat even for a short time period (see The Advantages of Incumbency, pp. 258-262)
When the framers of the Constitution set out to design the Executive Branch they disagreed on the amount of authority and leverage that the President should have. While some, such as Alexander Hamilton advocated a strong, independent executive, others, still reminded of the tyranny of King George, wanted a weaker executive with little independent power (see Designing the Executive Branch, pp. 69-72 and The President as Chief Executive, pp. 329-330). One of the solutions was to design a legislative check over Executive actions such as ratifying treaties and agency appointments. While not all bureaucratic positions are appointed, the President has the right to appoint officers to the heads of different agencies, the Senate must first ratify those top-level appointments before they can assume their position (see Civil Service Reform pp. 369-371). While the Senate rarely rejects Presidential nominees, the Senate can slow or stall the appointment process completely (see Senatorial Approval pp. 398-401). As this article explains, the current administration still does not have in place many of its appointed officials. While these delays are both a result of the slow Senate’s confirmation process as well as the administration’s tightened vetting process, both causes are a result of Constitutional design.
